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LECTURE 
LEX MAJORIS PARTIS: 
HOW THE SENATE CAN END  
THE FILIBUSTER ON ANY DAY  
BY SIMPLE MAJORITY RULE 
AKHIL REED AMAR† 
INTRODUCTION 
Though I never knew Professor Brainerd Currie—he died when I 
was just a lad—I did know and admire his son, Professor David 
Currie, who passed away in 2007. I was especially impressed by the 
younger Currie’s sustained interest in congressional 
constitutionalism1—that is, in various constitutional issues that have 
arisen in Congress and that have often involved special rules and 
procedures of Congress itself. In the tradition of the younger 
Professor Currie, I propose to use this hour, as the 2013 Currie 
Lecturer, to address one of the most important contemporary issues 
of congressional constitutionalism: the Senate filibuster. 
In this hour I shall argue that, contrary to what many senators 
say and what some of them might even believe, the Senate may 
eliminate current filibuster practice on any day it chooses, and may do 
so by a simple majority vote. My main argument today reprises 
material from my recent book, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The 
Precedents and Principles We Live By, and I am particularly grateful 
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 † Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University. This essay derives, 
virtually verbatim, from the Currie Lecture, delivered at Duke University School of Law on 
February 21, 2013. Special thanks to the editors of the Duke Law Journal for their kind 
willingness to accommodate my crazy schedule. Readers of this Lecture may be interested to 
learn that, exactly nine months after I delivered these remarks at Duke—on Thursday, 
November 21, 2013—the U.S. Senate chose to embrace the constitutional theory of filibuster 
reform presented in this Lecture. For a brief analysis of the Senate’s actions on November 21, 
2013 and of their dramatic implications, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Nuclear-Option Genie is 
Out of the Bottle, SLATE (Nov. 21, 2013, 5:38 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2013/11/
21/senate_goes_for_nuclear_option_and_nothing_will_ever_be_the_same.html. 
 1. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST 
PERIOD 1789–1801 (1997). 
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that the Duke Law School has kindly arranged for copies of this book 
to be given to the students in attendance today. In a brief Coda to my 
main argument, I shall offer additional elaboration, placing my views 
in the context of recent events on Capitol Hill and explaining how my 
proposed approach intersects with longstanding arguments about 
whether the U.S. Senate is or is not a “continuing body.” 
I. 
Multimember institutions, such as the House, the Senate, and the 
Court, can do nothing—nothing at all!—unless certain basic social-
choice rules are in place within these institutions. Crucially, there 
must exist master rules that determine how many votes within each 
institution will suffice to achieve certain results. Yet the written 
Constitution does not textually specify the master voting rule that 
operates inside these three chambers. Happily, two centuries of actual 
practice make clear that the bedrock constitutional principle within 
each is simple majority rule. 
Some senators today, however, think otherwise. They think that 
the Senate’s current filibuster system cannot be abolished by a simple 
majority vote. They should think again, for they have misread 
America’s Constitution, written and unwritten. To see why, let’s first 
canvas the internal voting rules and deliberation protocols that apply 
within the Supreme Court and the House of Representative and then 
use the evidence and insights generated by this canvas to analyze the 
modern Senate filibuster. 
The Constitution explicitly provides for a Chief Justice, but does 
not specify his role, except as the official who chairs presidential 
impeachment trials. Perhaps the Chief’s most important Court role, 
established by Court tradition, involves his power to assign opinions. 
Whenever he finds himself in the initial majority after oral argument, 
he decides which Justice shall take the lead in trying to compose an 
opinion on behalf of the Court. Of course, he may opt to assign the 
opinion-writing power/duty to himself, as John Marshall did in most 
important cases of his day, and as Earl Warren did in landmark cases 
such as Brown v. Board of Education and Reynolds v. Sims. 
Thanks to the necessary-and-proper clause, Congress has also 
vested the Chief Justice with sundry administrative and supervisory 
responsibilities for the federal judiciary as a whole, but none of these 
congressional statutes has done much to clarify the Chief’s authority 
within the Supreme Court itself. And while Congress has defined the 
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jurisdiction of the Court and has enacted various rules of evidence 
and procedure for litigants who come before the Justices, federal 
lawmakers have opted to leave a great deal of the internal protocol 
among the Justices to be worked out by the Justices themselves.2 
But by what voting rule? While the written Constitution left the 
matter unspecified, four interrelated factors pointed to simple 
majority rule as the master norm among the Justices, at least in the 
absence of some contrary protocol prescribed by Congress. 
First, majority rule has unique mathematical properties that 
make it the obvious answer. When an uneven number of Justices are 
deciding between two simple alternatives, such as whether to affirm 
or reverse a lower-court decision or whether to rule for the plaintiff 
or the defendant in a trial situation, there is always an alternative that 
commands the support of a majority, but there might be no 
alternative that enjoys more than majority support. 
Second, anyone who had studied Locke’s canonical Second 
Treatise of Government—as had most of the leading American 
revolutionaries—had learned that majority rule was the natural 
default principle of all assemblies. In Locke’s words: “[I]n assemblies 
impowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by that 
positive law which impowers them, the act of the majority passes for 
the act of the whole and, of course, determines, as having by the law 
of nature and reason the power of the whole.”3 
Other Founding-era authorities said the same thing. Building on 
this broad tradition, Thomas Jefferson’s mid-1780s booklet, Notes on 
the State of Virginia, declared that “Lex majoris partis [is] founded in 
common law as well as common right. It is the natural law of every 
assembly of men, whose numbers are not fixed by any other law.”4 In 
written remarks read aloud to the Philadelphia Convention, 
Benjamin Franklin described majority rule as “the Common Practice 
 
 2. For general discussion of the various powers of the Chief Justice, see Judith Resnik & 
Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers and the Term of the Chief 
Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575 (2006). 
 3. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 96 (Thomas P. Peardon, ed, 
1952) (1689). See generally WILLMOORE KENDALL, JOHN LOCKE AND THE DOCTRINE OF 
MAJORITY-RULE (1959); Bernard Wishy, John Locke and the Spirit of ’76, 73 POL. SCI. Q. 413 
(1958).  
 4. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (Frank Shuffelton ed., 
Penguin Books 1999) (1795) (footnotes omitted) (citing Brooke, Hakewell, and Puffendorf). 
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of Assemblies in all Countries and Ages.” None of his fellow 
delegates said otherwise.5 
Third, the Constitution’s text evidently incorporated this 
majoritarian premise, albeit by implication. Whenever a federal 
institution was authorized by the Constitution to make a certain 
decision using some principle other than simple majority rule, the 
exception to the (implicit) rule was specified in the document itself. 
For example, the text made clear that a two-thirds vote was necessary 
for the Senate to convict an impeachment defendant or approve a 
proposed treaty, or for either house to expel a member, approve a 
constitutional amendment, or override a presidential veto. For other 
actions, majority rule simply went without saying. 
Several of the Constitution’s provisions prescribing 
supermajorities make the most sense only if we assume that majority 
rule was the self-evident background principle that applied in the 
absence of a specific clause to the contrary. Thus, Article I 
presupposed that each house would “pass” legislative bills by 
majority vote—except when trying to override presidential vetoes, 
which would require a special supermajority. The supermajorities for 
constitutional amendments likewise were designed to be more 
demanding than the simple majorities for ordinary statutes; and the 
Senate supermajority for treaty ratification was meant to erect a 
higher bar than for ordinary Senate agreement to ordinary 
legislation—a higher bar meant to offset the absence of the House in 
the formal treaty making process. Similarly, the provisions 
empowering each house to exclude improperly elected or 
constitutionally ineligible candidates were meant to operate by simple 
majority rule—as distinct from the exceptional supermajority rule that 
applied when a house sought to expel duly elected and fully eligible 
members.6 
 
 5. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 198 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911). 
 6. On the enactment of ordinary laws by simple majority, see generally THE FEDERALIST 
No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton); id. NO. 58 (James Madison); id. NO. 62 (James Madison); Jed 
Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73 (1996). On the basic 
difference between statutes and constitutional amendments, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3–33 (1991). On the way in which treaty supermajority rules help offset 
the absence of the House, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 
190 (2005). On the key differences between house exclusion by majority vote and house 
expulsion by supermajority, see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 496, 506–12 (1969). 
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But if majority rule truly went without saying, then why did the 
Framers feel the need to specify in Article I, Section 5 that a majority 
of each house would constitute a quorum? The obvious answer is that 
state constitutions and British practice had varied widely on the 
quorum question, and thus on this special issue there did not exist an 
obvious default rule from universal usage or mathematical logic. For 
example, Pennsylvania set the quorum bar at two-thirds, whereas the 
English rule since the 1640s had provided that any 40 members could 
constitute a quorum of the House of Commons. But neither 
Parliament nor any state circa 1787 generally required more than 
simple house majority votes for the passage of bills or the adoption of 
internal house procedures, even though in many of these states no 
explicit clause explicitly specified this voting rule. In America circa 
1787, majority rule in these contexts thus truly did go without saying. 
We should also note that the Constitution’s electoral-college 
clauses explicitly speak of the need for a majority vote. In this 
context, involving candidate elections, majority rule did not go 
without saying as the obvious and only default rule. Plurality rule 
furnished a salient alternative (and indeed the rule that even today 
remains the dominant one for candidate contests in America). But 
this point about candidate elections, which might involve voting on 
three or more persons simultaneously, did not apply to the enactment 
of house rules or the exclusion of members under Article I, Section 5 
or the enactment of laws under Article I, Section 7—all of which 
involved binary decisions against the status quo. (As noted, majority 
rule has unique mathematical advantages in situations of binary 
choice.) 
Fourth, and as I explain in considerable detail in my book, 
America’s Unwritten Constitution, majority rule was not only implicit 
in the Constitution’s text, but also visible in its very enactment. 
Nothing in Article VII explicitly said that the thirteen state 
ratification conventions should act by simple majority rule, but this is 
what every convention did, and in a manner that suggested that the 
issue was self-evident.7 
Thus, in a wide range of constitutional contexts, majority rule 
went without saying. For the same reason this background rule 
applied to ratifying conventions, and to each house of Congress, it 
applied to the Court as well. 
 
 7. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 56–63 (2012). 
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From its first day to the present day, the Court has routinely 
followed the majority-rule principle without even appearing to give 
the matter much thought. As a rule, when five Justices today say that 
the law means X and four say it means Y, X it is. Over the years the 
Court has invalidated dozens of congressional laws by the slimmest of 
margins: 5–4. 
Politicians and commentators have occasionally urged Congress 
to respond with a statute forbidding the Court to strike down federal 
legislation unless the Court vote is at least 6–3. Yet Congress has 
never followed this advice—and with good reason, for hidden within 
this proposal there lurk at least two distinct and insuperable Article 
VI supremacy-clause problems. First, in situations not governed by 
the proposed statute the Court would presumably continue to operate 
by majority rule. For example, Congress surely would not want the 
Court to enforce state laws violating congressional statutes so long as 
the state got four of the nine Court votes. But if a simple majority 
vote would suffice to vindicate a federal statute over a state law, the 
same simple majority vote should suffice to vindicate the Constitution 
over a federal statute. By trying to change the Court’s voting rule 
selectively, the proposed statute would violate the legal hierarchy laid 
down in Article VI, which privileges the Constitution over federal 
statutes in exactly the same way that it privileges (constitutionally 
proper) federal statutes over mere state laws. Second and more 
generally, any statute that gave a jurist brandishing a mere 
congressional law (or any other sub-constitutional law) a weightier 
vote than a dueling jurist wielding the Constitution would improperly 
invert the clear prioritization of legal norms established by the 
supremacy clause.8 
 
 8. Could Congress enact a statute requiring that no federal law be held unconstitutional 
unless the court hearing the case is unanimous? If so, were Congress to structure a Court of 100 
members (as the Constitution allows), the Court would have to enforce a federal law even if 99 
of the 100 Justices found that law clearly unconstitutional. At this point, judicial review would 
have effectively been undone by a mere statute. If this goes too far—and it surely does—the 
only principled stopping point on the slippery slope is to insist that Congress may pass no law 
giving any judge who sides against a constitutional claim more weight than a judge who sides 
with a constitutional claim—a principle implicit in the supremacy clause itself. 
  Two state constitutions have provisions preventing their respective state supreme 
courts from declaring state legislation unconstitutional unless the court acts by supermajority. In 
North Dakota, the state constitution authorizes a majority of a quorum of the state supreme 
court to act for the court in all situations “provided that the supreme court shall not declare a 
legislative enactment unconstitutional unless at least four [of the five] of the members of the 
court so decide.” N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4. This clause has been understood to apply only when 
the issue is whether a North Dakota statute violates the state constitution. Thus read, it raises 
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Could the Justices themselves decide by simple majority rule to 
abandon Court-majority rule in some situations where these sorts of 
supremacy-clause problems do not arise? In fact, the Court has done 
just that, but in a manner that has preserved the ultimate authority of 
majority rule. By Court tradition, four Justices—a minority—can put 
a case on the docket and can ordinarily guarantee that the petitioner 
seeking review will be able to press his case via full briefing and oral 
argument. But ultimately, the Court majority of five has the last 
word—not just on the merits of the case, but on whether the Court 
itself will in fact issue any opinion. At any time, a simple Court 
majority of five can dismiss any case on the docket, even if the 
remaining four Justices adamantly object. In short, minority rules 
such as the “Rule of Four” nest within a framework of simple 
majority rule.9 
A similar analysis applies to the voting rules followed by the 
House of Representatives. In general, the House follows the 
Constitution’s implicit directive of simple majority rule in performing 
its basic constitutional functions: enacting legislation, authorizing 
expenditures, organizing itself, judging its members’ elections and 
qualifications, issuing subpoenas, adjudicating contempts, maintaining 
order within its own walls, and impeaching executive and judicial 
officers. True, a labyrinth of House rules—most obviously, a set of 
rules enabling committees and the House leadership to dictate the 
House agenda and another set of rules regulating parliamentary 
 
no major federal problem. North Dakota is not obliged to have a state constitution that trumps 
ordinary state statutes, nor is the state obliged to provide for strong judicial enforcement of its 
state constitution. The Nebraska Constitution features a similar clause: “A majority of the [state 
supreme court] members sitting shall have authority to pronounce a decision except in cases 
involving the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature. No legislative act shall be held 
unconstitutional except by the concurrence of five [of the court’s seven] judges.” NEB. CONST. 
art. V, § 2. The Nebraska clause apparently has been held by the state supreme court to apply to 
cases involving claims that a state statute violates the federal Constitution. See DeBacker v. 
Brainard, 161 N.W. 2d 508, 508–09 (Neb. 1968) (per curiam); see also DeBacker v. Sigler, 175 
N.W. 2d 912, 914 (Neb. 1970) (Spencer, J., dissenting). To the extent that this clause might 
direct the state’s highest court to affirmatively enforce a state statute despite the fact that a 
court majority deems the statute contrary to the U.S. Constitution, this clause plainly violates 
the federal supremacy clause, which specifically addresses state judges and obliges them to 
prioritize the U.S. Constitution over a mere state statute. No other state follows the North 
Dakota or Nebraska model. Instead, majority rule generally prevails on state courts. For an 
excellent discussion, see Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme 
Court Supermajority Rule: Lessons from the Past, 78 IND. L.J. 73 (2003). 
 9. For a subtle analysis of how the Court’s majority has ultimately exercised its power to 
manage and/or dismiss cases docketed by a Court minority, see Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. 
Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067 (1988). 
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procedure—may prevent a given matter from ever reaching the 
House floor for a simple majority vote. But these internal rules are 
themselves authorized at the biennial beginning of each new 
Congress under the aegis of Article I, Section 5—and they are 
authorized by a simple chamber majority in keeping with the 
Constitution’s letter and spirit.10 
II. 
Not so with what has now become perhaps the most 
dysfunctional aspect of modern American institutional practice: the 
Senate filibuster. Thanks to an internal Senate rule allowing 
filibusters—Senate Rule 22, to be precise—the de facto threshold for 
enacting a wide range of legislation has in recent years become 60 
votes instead of the constitutionally proper 51 votes. Under Rule 22, a 
mere 41 senators can prevent a typical bill from ever reaching the 
Senate floor for a final vote, even if 59 senators on the other side are 
intensely eager to end debate and approve the bill. Can you spell 
“gridlock?” 
The filibuster rule itself is not approved biennially at the outset 
of each new congressional term. Rather, this old rule, initially 
adopted by the Senate in the 1910s and significantly revised in the 
1970s, simply carries over from one Congress to the next by inertia, 
under the notion that the Senate, unlike the House, is a continuing 
body. Thus Senate rules, once in place, need never be formally 
 
 10. Although in recent years the House occasionally adopted internal rules requiring 
supermajority votes in the enactment of certain types of laws—laws raising taxes, for example—
leading constitutional scholars have condemned these rules as unconstitutional under Article I, 
Section 7, see Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 83. Other thoughtful scholars have defended these 
rules by arguing that each house has always retained the inalienable right to suspend 
supermajority requirements at any time, and to do so by a simple majority vote—a theory 
honoring the Constitution’s basic requirement of house-majority rule, but relocating the 
effective locus of this constitutional norm from Article I, Section 7 to Article I, Section 5. See 
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Rights of Legislators and the Wrongs of 
Interpretation: A Further Defense of the Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Rules, 47 
DUKE L.J. 327, 343–46 (1997). One noteworthy limit on the agenda-setting power of House 
leaders and committees is embodied in the device of the discharge petition. Through this 
theoretically important if little-used safety valve, a majority of the entire House—218 
members—may bypass committee veto-gates and bring a bill to the floor. And for the argument 
that all House rules are and indeed must be modifiable at all times by a later House majority, 
see id.; see also United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892). 
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reenacted. Similarly, Senate leaders, once in place, need never be 
formally re-elected.11 
But the Senate does generally retain the right to oust any 
holdover leaders at any time and to do so by a simple majority vote—
and this majoritarian principle, which clearly applies to holdover 
Senate leaders, should also apply to holdover Senate rules. Thus, all 
Senate rules, including the filibuster rule, are valid if and only if a 
majority of the Senate at any time may change the old rules by simple 
majority vote.12 
But some senators today seem to believe that a simple Senate 
majority cannot change the old filibuster rule, even if this Senate 
majority emphatically wants change. Why not? Because the old 
filibuster rule says so. That’s some catch, that Catch-22.13 
This circular logic will not do. The filibuster rule, like every other 
American law or regulation, is ultimately subordinate to America’s 
Constitution. If the Constitution requires ultimate majority rule in the 
Senate, no purported Senate rule may properly say otherwise. And in 
fact, America’s Constitution, correctly understood, does require 
ultimate majority rule in the Senate. Insofar as the old filibuster rule 
claims the status of an entrenched protocol that cannot be altered by 
an insistent current Senate majority, then the old filibuster rule is to 
this exact extent unconstitutional, and should be treated as such by 
the Senate itself, acting as the proper promulgators and judges of 
their own procedures. Concretely, if a simple majority of the Senate 
ever did take steps to repeal the filibuster rule, the Senate’s presiding 
officer should rule this repeal to be in order and this ruling from the 
chair should be upheld by a simple Senate majority. And that would 
be that: No more filibusters. 
We need not insist that a current Senate majority has the right to 
change its rules instantaneously and peremptorily. Thus, the Senate’s 
presiding officer may properly allow each side ample time to make its 
 
 11. The specific ways in which the Senate operates as a “continuing body” are complex, as 
I explain in my coda. 
 12. Thus, while the Senate need not re-enact its standing rules every two years—as the 
House has generally felt it must—the Senate, like the House, must be free to repeal any 
standing rule and must be free to do so by simple majority vote. 
 13. According to Senate Rule 22—I swear I am not making up this number!—a motion to 
end debate “shall be decided in the affirmative by three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and 
sworn—except on a measure or motion to amend the Senate rules, in which case the necessary 
affirmative vote shall be two-thirds of the Senators present and voting.” STANDING RULES OF 
THE SENATE, R. XXII, in COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., SENATE MANUAL, S. DOC. NO. 112-1, 
at 21 (2011). 
AMAR IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2014  8:04 PM 
1492 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1483 
case before holding a vote on a Senate rule change. But any attempt 
to prevent a reform vote altogether via dilatory tactics—that is, any 
attempt to indefinitely filibuster attempted filibuster reform—would 
violate the applicable written and unwritten constitutional principles. 
This conclusion may astonish. Some might think that if the name 
of the game is close attention to actual governmental practice, the fact 
that the filibuster exists, and the fact that many senators claim that it 
cannot be altered by a simple majority are unanswerable game-
winners. 
It is precisely at this point that the general framework that I put 
forth in my recent book, America’s Unwritten Constitution, proves its 
worth. In a nutshell, I argued in that book that there exist various 
tools and techniques enabling interpreters to range beyond individual 
words and clauses in the written Constitution while remaining 
entirely faithful to the grand project of American constitutionalism. 
Let us, then, carefully apply this framework to the filibuster issue. 
Begin by noting that even though majority rule is not always 
explicitly specified in various clauses of the written Constitution, it 
surely forms part of America’s implicit Constitution in certain 
respects. If the Senate may entrench (that is, enact and insulate from 
simple majoritarian repeal) a rule that 60 votes are required to pass a 
given bill, the Senate could likewise entrench a rule that 70 votes are 
required. But such a rule would plainly violate the letter and logic of 
Article I, Section 7, which provides that a two-thirds Senate majority 
always suffices, even when the president vetoes a particular bill. 
Surely it follows a fortiori that something less than a two-thirds vote 
suffices in the absence of a veto. 
And that something is majority rule, as is powerfully evident 
from America’s enacted Constitution—that is, from the very process 
by which the written text itself was enacted into law and thus sprang 
to life. This enactment process in 1787–88 confirms that majority rule 
does indeed go without saying in the Constitution, in the absence of 
strong implicit or explicit contraindication. Majority rule supplied the 
self-evident master norm for state ratifying conventions organized 
under Article VII. This key fact provides a compelling reason to 
believe that majority rule likewise provides the self-evident master 
norm for senatorial legislation under Article I, Section 7 and also for 
senatorial internal rulemaking under Article I, Section 5. Thus, unless 
we find in the written or unwritten Constitution some strong 
contraindication, majority rule is the Constitution’s proper voting 
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protocol when the Senate decides whether to keep or scrap the 
filibuster rule.14 
Nothing in America’s lived Constitution—the norms and customs 
of ordinary Americans living out their daily lives—provides strong 
contraindication. While it would be surprising if the daily rhythms 
and routines of average Americans decisively answered technical 
questions concerning the Senate’s internal procedures, it is perhaps 
noteworthy that when average Americans participate in various clubs 
and the like, they quite often and without much ado practice majority 
rule. 
Likewise, nothing in America’s doctrinal Constitution, based on 
judicial teachings, supports the entrenched filibuster. Not only have 
the Justices themselves always followed majority rule, but in the 1892 
case, United States v. Ballin, the Court explicitly embraced majority 
rule as the background master norm for each house of Congress: 
[T]he general rule of all parliamentary bodies is that, when a 
quorum is present, the act of a majority of the quorum is the act of 
the body. This has been the rule for all time, except so far as in any 
given case the terms of the organic act under which the body is 
assembled have prescribed specific limitations. . . . No such 
limitation is found in the Federal Constitution, and therefore the 
general law of such bodies obtains.15 
Nor does anything in America’s symbolic Constitution—the special 
cultural icons in our legal-cultural pantheon, such as Lincoln’s 
Gettysburg Address and King’s “I Have a Dream” speech—argue for 
an entrenched Senate filibuster rule. Many ordinary citizens today 
disdain Senate Rule 22, and this disdain has a long history. The most 
memorable filibusters in the American experience occurred in the 
1950s and early 1960s, when various Southern senators tried to thwart 
much-needed civil rights legislation—legislation that eventually 
passed in the mid-1960s and became the pride of the nation, 
reaffirming the equality of all races (and also of both sexes). In short, 
key elements of America’s symbolic Constitution came about despite 
the filibuster, not because of it. 
Nor, finally, does the history of actual institutional practice 
provide solid support for an entrenched filibuster rule. Properly 
 
 14. On majority rule as the obvious command of Article I, Section 7, see Rubenfeld, supra 
note 6, at 78–85. On majority rule as the obvious command of Article I, Section 5 see McGinnis 
& Rappaport, supra note 10, at 343–46. 
 15. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 6 (1891). 
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construed and contextualized, the history of Senate practice in fact 
supports modern-day filibuster reformers.16 
Nothing like Rule 22’s Catch-22 was in place in the age of 
George Washington or in the Jeffersonian era that followed. 
Throughout the 1790s and early 1800s the Senate practiced and 
preached simple majority rule. Under the procedures that governed 
the Senate during its earliest years, a senator could move “the 
previous question” and thereby end debate if a majority of senators 
agreed; and senators could also call an unruly orator to order at any 
time and thereby oblige him to “sit down,” subject to a ruling by the 
chair and if necessary an appeal to the Senate as whole.17 
While some scholars have quibbled about the precise operation 
of these initial rules, the history of the Senate prior to the 1830s offers 
no notable examples of organized and obstructionist filibustering—
and absolutely nothing like a pattern of systematic, self-perpetuating, 
entrenched frustration of Senate-majority rule. Thomas Jefferson, the 
Senate’s presiding officer from 1797–1801, was thus describing actual 
senatorial norms and usages when he penned the following passages 
of his 1801 Manual of Parliamentary Practice for the Use of the Senate 
of the United States: “No one is to speak impertinently or beside the 
question, superfluously or tediously. . . . The voice of the majority 
decides. For the lex majoris partis is the law of all councils, elections, 
&c. where not otherwise expressly provided.”18 
For much of the mid-nineteenth century, even as Senate 
minorities began to develop and deploy dilatory tactics, these tactics 
typically occurred with the indulgence of the Senate majority. 
Longwinded speechifying occasionally delayed the Senate’s business, 
but ordinarily orations did not prevent majorities from ending debate 
at some point and taking a vote. The Senate in those days was smaller 
and had less business to transact. The upper chamber often opted to 
indulge individual senators as a matter of courtesy. In turn, the 
indulged senators did not routinely try to press their privileges so as 
to prevent Senate majorities from governing. For example, in 1850 
 
 16. For a wise reminder that practices do not typically interpret and contextualize 
themselves, and that different opinions are apt to exist about how best to interpret a practice, 
see Jerry L. Mashaw, Governmental Practice and Presidential Direction: Lessons from the 
Antebellum Republic?, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 659, 663 (2009). 
 17. S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (April 16, 1789). 
 18. See generally SARAH S. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE? 
FILIBUSTERING IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE (1997); Richard R. Beeman, Unlimited Debate 
in the Senate, the First Phase, 83 POL. SCI. Q. 419 (1968).  
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politicians of all stripes from all regions understood that California’s 
admission—giving free states a narrow but decisive majority over 
slave states in the Senate—mattered hugely precisely because the 
Senate’s operative principle in the mid-nineteenth century was in fact 
simple majority rule. According to one expert treatise, prior to the 
1880s virtually every obstructed measure eventually prevailed against 
the opposition’s stalling tactics.19 
In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, routine 
filibustering practices have skyrocketed. Yet senators in the modern 
era have failed to achieve a general consensus via a compelling line of 
clean, consistent Senate rulings on the key constitutional question. 
Properly framed, this question is not whether the Senate may choose 
by inaction and inertia to keep the filibuster, nor whether the Senate 
may choose to keep the filibuster by re-adopting it via a fresh 
majority vote. Rather, the question is whether the current Senate is 
simply stuck with the old filibuster rule, even if a current majority 
emphatically wants to change the rule and explicitly votes to do so. 
This issue has only intermittently arisen in a clean parliamentary 
fashion. Over the years various senators may have quietly favored the 
old filibuster rule but have not wanted to publicly take the blame for 
this position, preferring instead to shroud the issue in layer upon layer 
of procedural complexity. 
In 1975, a majority of the Senate in fact upheld a constitutional 
ruling of the vice president, sitting in the chair, that a mere majority 
could rightfully end debate on filibuster reform and overturn the old 
filibuster rule. Shortly thereafter, however, the Senate voted to 
reconsider its earlier action, leaving us today with a Rorschach-blot 
precedent whose meaning is largely in the eye of the beholder. In the 
early twenty-first century, Republican senators frustrated by the 
success of the Democratic minority in blocking votes on various 
judicial nominations loudly threatened to revise the old filibuster rule 
by a simple majority vote. This threatened revision, popularly 
nicknamed “the nuclear option,” never came to a conclusive floor 
vote. Instead, Democrats moderated their obstructionism and 
Republicans sheathed their sword. 
 
 19. FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE, FILIBUSTERING IN THE SENATE 39 (1940); see also David R. 
Mayhew, Supermajority Rule in the U.S. Senate, 36 POL. SCI. & POL. 31, 31 (2003) (noting that 
for most of its history, the Senate never “had any anti-majoritarian barrier as concrete, as 
decisive, or as consequential as today’s rule of 60”). See generally Beeman, supra note 18. 
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Precursors of this “nuclear option”—also known as “the 
constitutional option”—were forcefully advocated by prominent 
senators throughout the twentieth century, and at various moments 
over the last sixty years these precursors have in fact won the 
considered support of vice presidents and Senate majority leaders of 
both parties. Many of the most important filibuster reforms of the 
twentieth century came about when reformers first threatened the 
“constitutional option” and then compromised by effectuating their 
desired reforms in an endgame process that formally obeyed the 
Senate’s Catch-22 rule structure.20 
If a Senate majority truly were powerless to set things right, then 
Senate practice would be wildly out of step with the practice of its 
sibling body, the House of Representatives. In the House, majority-
rule rules today and has always ruled. While this fact alone does not 
prove that majority rule is required by Article I, Section 5, it surely 
confirms that majority rule is consistent with this Section.21 
 
 20. For discussion of the 1975 rulings, see John C. Roberts, Majority Voting in Congress: 
Further Notes on the Constitutionality of the Senate Cloture Rule, 20 J.L. & POL. 505, 516–17 
(2004). For a contrasting account claiming the existence of a clear senatorial pattern rejecting 
prototypes of the nuclear option, see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 
21 CONST. COMMENT. 445, 476–78 (2004). Gerhardt’s own narrative, however, itself provides 
evidence that the Senate has in fact flip-flopped on the key issue. For an illuminating account of 
the strong senatorial and vice presidential support for the nuclear/constitutional option for 
much of the last century, and a sophisticated discussion of how the strong threat of the 
nuclear/constitutional option has repeatedly operated to win filibuster reforms that formally 
followed the Catch-22 voting rules laid down by previous Senate rules, see Martin B. Gold and 
Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option To Change Senate Rules and Procedures: A 
Majoritarian Means To Overcome the Filibuster, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205 (2004). For 
the early-twenty-first-century Republicans’ argument for the nuclear option, see John Cornyn, 
Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need for Filibuster Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 181 (2003); Orrin G. Hatch, Judicial Nomination Filibuster Cause and Cure, 2005 
UTAH L. REV. 803.  
 21. For a qualification/clarification of my claim about House practice, see supra note 10. 
Note that the majority-rule principle operates slightly differently for each half of Congress. In 
the House, new rules are affirmatively adopted by majority vote at the start of every new 
congressional term. In the Senate, the old rules need not be adopted by majority vote at the 
start, but must be repealable by majority rule. Under an alternative characterization, the old 
Senate’s rules do lapse at the end of each Congress, just like the old House’s rules, but the new 
Senate need not formally vote to readopt the old Senate rules at the outset of a new Congress. 
Instead, the new Senate may implicitly readopt the old Senate simply by acting in conformity 
with them. On this view, the new Senate at the beginning of its session may adopt a wholly new 
set of rules and may do so by following “general parliamentary law”—which enables a simple 
majority to end debate—until these new rules are adopted. See Gold & Gupta, supra note 20, at 
220–22 (explaining this theory—an early version of the constitutional option—as put forth by 
Senator Thomas J. Walsh in 1917). 
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III. 
The politically convenient assertion that today’s Senate majority 
is simply a powerless captive of ghosts of Senates past should ring 
particularly hollow to British ears—and this hollowness deserves 
special attention in any analysis of how America’s Constitution might 
look to a proper British constitutionalist attentive to unwritten 
constitutional norms and principles. While Britain has never had an 
American-style written Constitution, the British have developed a 
deep understanding of the proper relationship among Parliaments 
over time. It is a bedrock principle of British constitutionalism that 
one Parliament cannot bind a later Parliament. Otherwise, the 
inalienable right of parliamentary self-government would be lost. 
Indeed, what makes a right inalienable is precisely the fact that it is 
incapable of being waived, even by an actual practice of apparent 
waiver. 
Just as Americans at the Founding surely understood that no 
person could be a judge in his own case, thanks in part to 
Blackstone’s clear formulation of the basic principle, so too the 
Founders were intimately familiar with and embraced what 
Blackstone had to say about the relationship between one legislature 
and its successor: “Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of 
subsequent parliaments bind not.” Why not? Because, Blackstone 
explained, prior Parliaments are not legally superior to subsequent 
Parliaments. By what voting rule would each parliament proceed? 
Here too, Blackstone was clear: “In each house the act of the majority 
binds the whole.”22 
The same logic applies on this side of the Atlantic. Each house 
can make rules for itself. But neither house can entrench rules in a 
way that prevents a later house from governing itself. Only the 
Constitution can create entrenched rules of this sort. And on this 
 
 22. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *181. For analysis of British practice and 
theory strongly supportive of the approach advocated here, see Josh Chafetz’s remarks in his 
debate with Michael Gerhardt, Is the Filibuster Constitutional?, 158 U. PA L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 245, 250 (2010). On the equality of legislatures across time, see THE FEDERALIST 
No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he last [statute] in order of time shall be preferred to the 
first . . . from the nature and reason of the thing. . . . [B]etween the interfering acts of an equal 
authority, that which was the last indication of its [the legislature’s] will, should have the 
preference.”); cf. Newton v. Comm’rs, 100 U.S. 548, 559 (1879) (similar). On majority rule 
within each house, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
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issue, the rule that the Constitution has entrenched for each house is 
majority rule.23 
Because this protocol is established by the Constitution itself, the 
protocol cannot be changed by either house or by statute. Just as 
Congress may not properly enact an ordinary statute that changes the 
constitutional rules governing how future ordinary statutes are to be 
enacted, so too neither house may properly enact a house rule that 
changes the constitutional rules governing how future house rules are 
to be enacted. 
IV. 
Here is one way, then, of pulling together the basic argument. It 
is obvious that some specific voting rule must be used to 
operationalize the Article I, Section 5 power and duty of each house 
to determine its own rules of proceeding. If majority rule is not the 
implicit rule, what is? Without some jumpstarting rule, the first House 
and the first Senate in 1789 would have faced an insoluble infinite 
regress problem. (By what initial voting rule would each house decide 
what voting rule to use in determining its rules of proceedings? By 
what pre-initial voting rule would that initial voting rule be decided? 
By what pre-pre-initial voting rule would the pre-initial voting rule be 
decided? And so on, without end.) But no such infinite regress in fact 
occurred in the first Congress because majority rule did in fact go 
without saying in each house in 1789 just as it had gone without 
saying in each ratifying convention in 1787–88. This first set of Article 
I, Section 5 votes thus established the first key point of actual 
practice. 
Just as the first House and the first Senate each used majority 
rule to decide its procedures, every subsequent House and Senate 
may and must do the same, for nothing in the Constitution made the 
Congress of 1789 king over later Congresses. All Congresses are 
equal in this respect. In fact—and this is a second key point about 
 
 23. Clear evidence that the Founding generation accepted this logic comes from the text of 
Virginia’s 1786 Bill of Religious Freedom, a landmark statute enacted largely thanks to the 
efforts of Jefferson and Madison: “[W]e well know that this Assembly, elected by the people for 
the ordinary purposes of Legislation only, have no power to restrain the acts of succeeding 
Assemblies constituted with powers equal to our own, and that therefore to declare this act 
irrevocable would be of no effect in law.” An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, 1785 Va. 
Acts ch. 34, reprinted in 12 STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF 
VIRGINIA 84, 86 (photo. reprint 1969) (William W. Hening ed., Richmond, George Cochran 
1823). 
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actual practice—neither house has ever formally required a 
supermajority for amendment of its rules. Not even Senate Rule 22 
has the audacity to openly assert that it cannot be repealed by simple 
majority vote. Rather, Rule 22 says only that debate on its own repeal 
cannot be ended by simple majority vote. 
The question thus becomes, is this supermajoritarian aspect of 
Rule 22 a genuine rule of debate or a de facto rule of decision? If 
Rule 22 simply means that the rule itself should not be repealed 
without a fair opportunity to debate the repeal, then Rule 22 is fully 
valid. But insofar as Rule 22 in fact allows repeal opponents to stall 
interminably so as to prevent a majoritarian repeal vote from ever 
being held, then Rule 22 is to that precise extent operating as an 
unconstitutionally entrenching supermajority rule of decision rather 
than a proper rule of debate. It is the right and duty of each senator to 
adjudicate for herself whether Rule 22 has in fact come to operate as 
an improper rule of decision rather than a proper rule of debate. And 
in adjudicating that question, the Senate, acting as a constitutional 
court of sorts, acts by majority rule, just as the Supreme Court itself 
does when adjudicating constitutional (and other) questions. 
CODA: A NOTE ON THE SENATE AS A CONTINUING BODY 
A simple question: Is the Senate a continuing body? It turns out 
the answer is not so simple, as illustrated by last month’s activities on 
Capitol Hill. And getting the right answer matters crucially for 
sensible filibuster reform in the weeks and months ahead. 
For some purposes, the Senate is surely a continuing 
body. Whereas the incoming House of Representatives had to 
affirmatively vote for John Boehner as its Speaker, no similar drama 
unfolded in the Senate: Harry Reid continued as Majority Leader 
purely by inertia, with no fuss or fanfare. So too, because Senator Pat 
Leahy had become Senate President pro tempore in the old Congress, 
he simply remained in place as the new Congress commenced. 
For other purposes, however, the Senate is not a continuing 
body. All the bills that passed the Senate before January 3 went 
“poof” as the clock chimed midnight. Most obviously, the $60 billion 
Hurricane Sandy relief package approved by the Senate in late 
December turned to dust at the witching hour. Thus a new relief bill 
had to be affirmatively re-passed by the new Senate, alongside the 
new House.  
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So the correct answer to our simple yes-or-no question is yes-
and-no. Though this seeming doublespeak may trouble some layfolk, 
there is nothing sinister afoot here. Law often works this way, as 
many of you doubtless learned in your 1L classes. For example, are 
corporations persons? Yes and no. Surely yes, for some purposes: 
Government cannot deprive a corporation of its property without due 
process of law. But for other purposes, corporations are properly not 
treated as persons. The axiom of one person, one vote applies only to 
flesh-and-blood. 
But what unifying principle explains when to treat the Senate as 
continuous and when to treat it as noncontinuous? And what does 
this unifying principle mean for filibuster reform? 
Because our written Constitution is remarkably terse, certain 
overarching principles must be inferred from the document read as a 
whole—principles such as the separation of powers, federalism, and 
the rule of law. Legislative bicameralism is another implicit principle. 
When passing laws, the Senate must act in tight bicameral co-
ordination with the House.  
The House is obviously not a continuing body. Every two years 
its entire membership comes before the voters, who are free to 
choose a completely new slate. Legally, no House member holds over 
from one House to the next. Because each House begins anew 
biennially, all House legislative bills legally expire when that House 
expires and a new House arises to replace it. In the spirit of bicameral 
symmetry and co-ordination, the same rules about legislative bills 
sensibly apply to the Senate: All Senate bills die when one Congress 
ends and a new one begins. Such has been the practice since the 
Founding. 
But on matters other than bicameral lawmaking, the 
Constitution generally allows each chamber to govern itself, and 
neither need mirror the other. The House must choose its leaders and 
its own internal rules of procedure at the outset of each new 
Congress, because all its members have been freshly elected by the 
voters. By contrast, only a third of the Senate’s membership comes 
before the voters in any given election, so this chamber can simply 
allow its internal procedures and its internal leadership to continue by 
inertia. Harry Reid need not be re-elected at the outset of this new 
Congress, but of course he can be ousted on any day if a Senate 
majority so decides. So too with old Senate rules, which need not be 
formally readopted every other January, but can be changed at any 
time. 
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Which brings us back, one last time, to the question of filibuster 
reform. The old Senate’s rules permitting filibusters carry forward by 
inertia. Of course they can be changed in January of odd-numbered 
years, as a new Congress begins, but they can also be changed on any 
other day—just as the Senate leadership can be changed at any time. 
Changing rules or leaders within a session is not improperly changing 
the rules of the game in the middle of the game. Rather, the game 
itself, as defined by the Constitution’s governing principles, allows 
new procedural rules and new leaders at any moment. 
But there is at least one basic constitutional principle that, absent 
a constitutional amendment, cannot be changed, ever: Majority 
rule—lex majoris partis. The Constitution makes no sense without this 
rule as the implicit backdrop. Constitutional amendments require 
supermajorities precisely because ordinary statutes do not; overruling 
a president’s veto requires a two-thirds vote of each house precisely 
because passing an ordinary law requires something less, namely a 
simple majority. In 1789, the first Senate adopted its procedural rules 
by simple majority vote, and all later Senates may likewise amend 
these rules by simple majority. 
Notably, the Senate’s existing filibuster rules do not themselves 
purport to require a supermajority vote to change them. But they do 
purport to require a supermajority vote to end debate on the question 
of filibuster reform.  
The simple solution to the issue of filibuster reform is thus for 
the Senate to take Rule 22 at its word and insist that this rule remain 
a mere rule of debate rather than a de facto rule of decision. In other 
words, the Senate must see to it that internal rules of debate and 
procedure stay within their constitutional bounds, and do not 
unconstitutionally morph into entrenched supermajority voting 
rules. The Senate itself today or on any day may properly decide that 
filibuster-reform opponents are actually preventing filibuster reform 
from ever coming to a vote. If so, reform opponents have improperly 
crossed a constitutional line: the filibuster rule is no longer operating 
as a constitutionally proper rule of genuine debate, but has instead 
become an unconstitutional supermajority rule of decision. In this 
situation, a simple majority of the Senate can rule that the filibuster 
system is operating unconstitutionally, in violation of the underlying 
majority-rule principle that constitutionally governs both House and 
Senate. Thus, a simple majority of Senators can rule any filibuster out 
of order, as a violation of constitutional first principles. 
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And to repeat, a majority of Senators can do this today or on any 
day, not just in January of odd-numbered years. On this precise issue, 
the Senate is indeed a continuing body; no day is any different from 
any other day. And unless the Constitution itself explicitly specifies 
otherwise (as it does for veto overrides, impeachment trials, and so 
on), the Senate always—today and every day—operates by ultimate 
majority rule. Every Senate rule and procedure must be amendable 
by a determined Senate majority, if that determined majority deems 
the old rule unsuitable. It’s just that simple. 
